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Racial Bias and the Right to an Impartial Jury: A
Standard for Allowing Voir Dire Inquiry
The goal of juror impartiality embraced by the sixth amendment'
is not easily defined or achieved because most individuals hold
prejudices that obstruct their ability to render a fair and impartial judg-
ment.2 These prejudices may be characterized as either actual bias,
based on a reaction to a specific circumstance, or bias implied by law,
arising from a certain relationship. Among attitudes that may affect a
juror's ability impartially to evaluate the credibility of testimony or to
draw inferences only from evidence presented at trial are racial and
ethnic prejudices that are pervasive in American society.
3
While there is no guarantee that an unbiased jury will be chosen in
every case, the voir dire examination 4 is one measure that, if used effec-
tively, may further the selection of an impartial panel. In addition, by
allowing a broad voir dire examination, latent prejudices may be dis-
closed and both parties may have a better source of information about
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968), the
Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment guarantees the right to a trial by jury in
all criminal cases that, were they to be tried in a federal court, would come within the sixth
amendment's guarantee. The concept of an impartial jury is implicit in civil trials also, as
provided by the seventh amendment. See, e.g., Kieman v. Von Schaik, 347 F.2d 775 (3d
Cir. 1965). Although the voir dire examination is important in civil cases, this Comment
focuses solely on voir dire in criminal cases under the sixth amendment guarantee of an
impartial trial.
2. "Thus, no thing... can create an impression unprejudiced by associations which
already exist in the mind. In the light of such facts it is humorous to hear a prospective juror
say in examination that he has formed no opinions as to the merits of the case, that he can sit
as a fair and impartial juror and that he can render a verdict according to the law and the
evidence as they are presented to him. This is impossible. His inherent, though possibly
unknown prejudices make such impartiality impossible." M. BROWN, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY
60-61 (1926), quoted in Note, Poir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the
Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1493, 1496 n.19 (1975); see also S.
FREuD, Psychoanalysis and the Ascertaintng of Truth in Courts of Law (1906) in THE HIS-
TORY OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MOVEMENT 115 (1963), cited in Gaba, Voir Dire of Jurors:
Constitutional Limits to the Right of Inquiry into Preudice, 48 U. COLO. L. REv. 525, 528
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Gaba].
3. Certain racial and ethnic groups traditionally have been victims of discrimination.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-14, at 1012-13 (1978).
4. Voir dire examination is a process of oral examination of prospective jurors.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1746 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
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the prospective jurors, which would enable them to use their jury chal-
lenges more effectively. Therefore, ample opportunity should be af-
forded during the voir dire examination of prospective jurors to
propound specific questions designed to uncover racial and ethnic
prejudice.
InAldridge v. United States,5 the Supreme Court held that the "es-
sential demands of fairness"'6 mandate that, in the district court trial of
a black defendant charged with the murder of a white police officer, a
defense request for voir dire questioning about racial prejudice be
granted. More than forty years later, in Ham v. South Carolina,7 the
Court identified the constitutional source of the Aldridge "essential de-
mands of fairness" as inherent in the purpose of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment to prevent invidious discrimination on
the basis of race. 8 In Ham, racial inquiry was constitutionally man-
dated in the trial of a black civil rights activist charged with drug pos-
session. After Ham, some circuit courts applied the constitutional right
to racial inquiry on voir dire to all situations in which such inquiry was
requested by the defense.9 Other circuit courts, however, limited the
application of the Ham constitutional right to factual circumstances
similar to those in Aldridge and Ham.l0
In the 1976 case of Ristaino v. Ross," the Supreme Court limited
the application of the constitutional right to racial inquiry on voir dire
to cases like Ham in which "special circumstances" are present. 12 Be-
cause the defendant in Ristaino had not claimed that he had been sin-
gled out in the community as a special target for racial prejudice,' 3 as
had the defendant in Ham, the Court concluded that racial inquiry was
not constitutionally required.
The 1981 case of Rosales-Lopez v. United States' 4 reiterated the
limited application of the constitutional right to voir dire racial inquiry
enunciated in Ristaino, but recognized that a nonconstitutional stan-
dard could be required in federal courts under the Supreme Court's
supervisory power.' 5 In Rosales-Lopez, the Court sustained the convic-
tion of the defendant, a man of Mexican descent, for smuggling Mexi-
5. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
6. Id. at 310.
7. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
8. Id. at 526-27.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 485 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1973). See notes 71-72
& accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 852 (1976). See text accompanying notes 73-74 infra.
11. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
12. Id. at 595-96.
13. Id. at 595-97.
14. 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
15. Id. at 190.
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can aliens into the United States despite the trial court's refusal to grant
the defendant's request that jurors be questioned about possible atti-
tudes they might have towards Mexican-Americans. Racial inquiry
was not required under the nonconstitutional standard appropriate in
federal courts because the Court found no "reasonable possibility" of
prejudice similar to that which might exist in circumstances similar to
Ham or in cases involving interracial violence.16
This Comment first notes the importance of racial inquiry on voir
dire as a method for identifying jurors who should be excused because
of their inability to separate racial attitudes from the determination of a
defendant's guilt. The Comment then discusses the Aldridge, Ham,
?istaino, and Rosales-Lopez decisions and concludes that the Supreme
Court's recognition that racial inquiry may be constitutionally required
has been unduly limited by Ristaino and Rosales-Lopez. The noncon-
stitutional standard for federal courts also is unreasonably limited and
defective because it creates inequality of treatment between federal and
state defendants. The Comment urges that a clear constitutional stan-
dard be adopted that requires a court to conduct racial inquiry on voir
dire when such inquiry is requested by a defendant facing a juror panel
composed of individuals of racial or ethnic backgrounds different from
that of the defendant.
Nature and Purpose of Voir Dire
An impartial jury is basic to the judicial system in all criminal
cases. It is this impartiality that enables the jury to analyze the evi-
dence and to make a fair and reliable determination of guilt or inno-
cence.17 Many jurors, however, possess a state of mind that affects their
ability to render an impartial verdict; they have a conscious or uncon-
scious bias.
Bias can be classified as either actual bias or bias implied by law.18
The Supreme Court has defined actual bias as the "existence of a state
of mind, on the part of a juror, which leads to a just inference in refer-
ence to the case that he will not act with entire impartiality."19 Implied
16. Id. at 192.
17. Gaba, supra note 2, at 526-27; see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); see also
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Marshall, observing the importance of an impartial jury in all criminal
cases, noted that the Supreme Court has "never suggested that this right to impartiality
protects against only certain classes of prejudice or extends to only certain groups in the
population. It makes little difference to a criminal defendant whether the jury has prejudged
him because of the color of his skin or because of the length of his hair. In either event, he
has been deprived of the right to present his case to neutral and detached observors capable
of rendering a fair and impartial verdict." Id. at 531-32.
18. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936).
19. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 432 (1897); see Gaba, supra note 2, at 530. Actual bias
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bias, which may be defined by statute,20 is based on the recognition that
certain relationships between a litigant and a prospective juror are
likely to result, consciously or unconsciously, in the bias of the juror.
2
1
Thus, bias can arise from two principal sources: a special reaction to
the facts of the particular case, or a special prejudice that is unrelated
to the particular case.
22
The voir dire examination affords the opportunity for direct ques-
tioning aimed at eliciting any undisclosed prejudices of the jurors. Al-
though the precise procedure of the voir dire examination varies by
jurisdiction, 23 in all jurisdictions the trial judge has the discretion to
determine the scope, method, and frequency of questioning. 24 If voir
dire questioning has identified a juror who possesses actual or potential
bias, counsel may remove him or her from the panel through the use of
may include the challenge of jurors for subjective factors such as racial, religious, economic,
political or social bias in criminal trials. See general Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 1204 (1957).
20. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1074 (listing various situations in which implied bias
could be the basis of a challenge: family or fiduciary relationship to defendant or victim,
prior involvement in the case, adverse litigant in civil case).
21. Gaba, supra note 2, at 530; Note, Voir Dire-Prevention of Prejudicial Questioning,
50 MINN. L. REV. 1088, 1090 (1966); see also Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 181
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
22. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure leave much discretion with the trial
judge sitting in a criminal case to conduct the examination personally or to allow the de-
fendant, the defendant's attorney, or the prosecuting attorney to conduct the inquiry. FED.
R. CRIM. P. 24(a). If the court decides to conduct the inquiry, the court may, in its discre-
tion, allow "such additional questions by the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper."
The Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System has recommended
that all federal courts adopt a court-conducted voir dire procedure. REPORT OF THE JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM, reprinted in The
Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 466 (1960).
The state courts are split in their use of the several alternatives of voir dire procedure.
Ten states follow the federal preference for a court-conducted voir dire; twenty-two states
allow attorneys and judges to conduct voir dire; in the remaining states, examination is left
to counsel. A.B.A. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE CRIM. TRIAL, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 63 (1968).
Proponents of court-conducted voir dire argue that court-conducted voir dire saves
time, an increasingly important concern in view of the courts' overcrowded dockets, and that
court-conducted voir dire has less likelihood of influencing the jury than does inquiry con-
ducted by the parties themselves. A. VANDERBILT, JUDGES AND JURORS: THEIR FUNC-
TIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND SELECTION 73 n.8 (1956).
24. The voir dire examination "is conducted under the supervision of the court, and a
great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion." Connors v. United States, 158
U.S. 408, 413 (1895); see Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527-28 (1973); Aldridge v.
United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931). As noted by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936): "Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state
of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Con-
stitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and
artificial formula."
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jury challenges. 25
There are two types of jury challenges: challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges. 26 A challenge for cause may be exercised when
counsel has reason to believe that a prospective juror will not be able to
view the evidence at trial in an impartial manner due to some previous
experience or some fixed attitude, such as an admitted bias.27 Chal-
lenges for cause, although unlimited in number,28 are available only
when the party requesting the use of the challenge can demonstrate a
cognizable prejudice of the juror.
29
The voir dire examination also enables counsel to make effective
use of the peremptory challenge. 30 Peremptory challenges allow coun-
sel to eliminate a prospective juror without stating the basis, if any, for
the challenge. 31 In Swain v. 4labama,32 the Court noted that, "While
challenges for cause perhit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified,
provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory
[challenge] permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less
easily designated or demonstrable. '33 Peremptory challenges are
granted "without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being
subject to the court's control."34 Peremptory challenges, however, are
limited in number.
35
25. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 532 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in part):
"[T]he right to an impartial jury carries with it the concomitant right to take reasonable steps
designed to insure that the jury is impartial. A variety of techniques is available to serve this
end, but perhaps the most important of these is the jury challenge." See also Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 379 (1972) (Powell, 3., concurring); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 209-22 (1965).
26. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CASES AND CONCEPTS 10 (1980).
27. Challenges for cause are founded upon a "narrowly specified, provable and legally
cognizable basis of partiality. . . ." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1966).
29. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). Other extraneous factors also limit
the effective use of a challenge for cause, including the reluctance of judges to find that an
individual is prejudiced. Gaba, supra note 2, at 530.
30. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), in which the Court stated that the voir
dire examination "tends to be extensive and probing, operating as a predicate for the exer-
cise of peremptories." Id at 218-19.
31. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 220; FED. R. CRim. P. 24.
32. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
33. Id at 220.
34. Id
35. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b) regulates the number of peremptory
challenges available to the litigants: "If the offense charged is punishable by death, each
side is entitled to 20 peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by impris-
onment for more than one year, the government is entitled to 6 peremptory challenges and
the defendant or defendants jointly to 10 peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is
punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year or by fine or both, each side is
entitled to 3 peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant, the court may
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The right to challenge for cause or the ability to make use of the
peremptory challenge therefore depends upon a probing and extensive
voir dire examination. If the voir dire examination is unreasonably
limited, the defendant may not be able to uncover the information nec-
essary to challenge the prospective jurors who may pose a threat to the
constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury.
The Development of a Constitutional Standard
Aldridge v. United States
The defendant's right to inquire into the possible racial prejudice
of prospective jurors was defined in 1931 inAidridge v. United States.36
InAldridge, an all white jury convicted a black man for the murder of a
white police officer. During the voir dire proceedings, the defense
counsel had requested that each juror be asked a question regarding
racial prejudice.37 The trial court considered such a question to be im-
proper 38 and denied the counsel's request. The defendant's conviction
was affirmed in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Writing for the United States Supreme Court on review, Chief
Justice Hughes noted that conditions in the District of Columbia ac-
corded blacks "all the privileges and rights under the law that are af-
forded the white race, and especially the right to practice in the courts
[and] serve on the jury . . . . 39 The Supreme Court, however, re-
versed the appellate court and held that the broader principles of jus-
tice and fairness outweighed the seeming equality of the laws of the
District of Columbia. 40
Chief Justice Hughes reasoned that the civil privileges of blacks as
a reflection of the dominant sentiment of the community should not be
the focus of the inquiry; the focus instead should be on the bias of the
prospective jurors who may sit at the trial.41 If the jurors were found to
be impartial, no injustice would result from permitting racial questions.
If, on the other hand, any juror were shown to be prejudiced against
the defendant and unable to render a fair verdict, gross injustice would
allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised sep-
arately or jointly." State statutes also vary the number of peremptory challenges. See Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 217 n.20.
36. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
37. From the Court's opinion, it appears that counsel for the defendant approached the
bench and asked that a question regarding racial prejudice be given to the prospective ju-
rors. The precise question was not set forth in the opinion, and it is unclear whether the
defense counsel asked a specific question or simply asked the court to ask a question regard-
ing racial prejudice. Id at 310.
38. Id
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result from allowing that juror to sit at the trial.42 Chief Justice Hughes
concluded:
We think that it would .be far more injurious to permit it to be
thought that persons entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were al-
lowed to serve as jurors and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact
of disqualification were barred. No surer way could be devised to
bring he processes of justice into disrepute.43
One question left unanswered by the Court's opinion is the basis
for its holding. Chief Justice Hughes's opinion did not cite any explicit
statutory or constitutional basis for its holding, but instead relied upon
a requirement of "the essential demands of fairness."44 This language
may be interpreted to indicate a guarantee of broad constitutional pro-
tection of the right to racial inquiry on voir dire. The Court, however,
did not specify a constitutional source for this protection.
The unstated basis for the Aldridge Court's conclusion may have
been the sixth amendment's guarantee of an impartial trial. The Court
alluded to the sixth amendment through its repeated use of the word
"impartial." In addition, the Court approvingly quoted an early Flor-
ida case, Pinder v. State,45 for the proposition that the propounding of a
question about racial prejudice is proper because a negative answer im-
pacts on the impartiality of the jury as guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.46 This emphasis on impartiality may point to a reliance on the
sixth amendment.
Another question left unanswered by the Court's opinion in .4-
dridge is whether the right to racial inquiry, whatever its basis, was
intended by the court to be limited to the particular facts of41dridge-
a black defendant accused of the murder of a white victim-or whether
this right could be extended to other situations, such as nonviolent or
victimless crimes. Aldridge may call for a broad application of the
sixth amendment. The Court cited several state cases upholding the
right to examine jurors on voir dire about the existence of a disqualify-
ing state of mind with regard to races other than the black race and
with regard to religion "and other prejudices of a serious character."47
42. Id
43. Id at 315.
44. Id at 310.
45. 27 Fla. 370, 8 So. 837 (1891).
46. 283 U.S. at 311 n.l.
47. Id at 313 (citing People v. Car Soy, 57 Cal. 102 (1880) (Chinese defendant); Wat-
son v. Whitney, 23 Cal. 375 (1963) (defendants were "squatters"); People v. Reyes, 5 Cal.
347 (1855) (Mexican defendants); Potter v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. 380, 216 S.W. 886 (1919) (libel
charge involved anti-Semitic statement; several jurors were Jewish); Horst v. Silverman, 20
Wash. 233, 55 P. 52 (1898) (Jewish defendant)). But see Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S.
308, 314 n.4 (1931) (citing Conners v. United States, 158 U.S. 408 (1895), to illustrate a
situation in which the suggestion of bias relating to political affiliations was held to be too
remote to require specific questions aimed at this bias during voir dire questioning).
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In formulating the Court's opinion, however, Chief Justice Hughes re-
lied principally on early state court decisions that involved situations
similar to that in Aldridge-trials of black defendants accused of vio-
lent crimes. 48 Thus, it is not clear whether the Court intended a right to
racial inquiry to exist in circumstances unlike those present before it.
In Aldridge, therefore, the Court did recognize a right to racial in-
quiry on voir dire, but failed to attach the right to a specific constitu-
tional provision and failed to delineate the specific circumstances that
give rise to the right. Many federal circuit courts, however, gave the
Aldridge rule a broad interpretation. For example, in United States v.
Gore,49 the court interpreted Aldridge as holding that the defendant in
every criminal case had the right to racial inquiry as part of the voir
dire examination. 0 In Frasier v. United States,5 1 the court felt similarly
"bound by the broad rule set forth inAldridge,' 52 and accordingly held
that it was reversible error for the trial judge to refuse to allow ques-
tioning of the jurors regarding possible racial prejudice in the trial of a
black defendant accused of making false statements about his Commu-
nist Party membership in an armed forces loyalty certificate. 53 Thus,
although the scope of the Aldridge opinion was unclear, later courts
interpreted it broadly.
Ham v. South Carolina
The Supreme Court again addressed the question whether inquiry
into racial prejudice during the voir dire examination was constitution-
ally required in Ham v. South Carolina.54 At issue in Ham was
whether the trial judge's refusal to examine the prospective jurors on
voir dire with respect to their possible prejudice against the defendant
violated the defendant's federal constitutional rights.
55
The defendant in Ham was a bearded black man, well known in
his South Carolina community for participation in civil rights activities.
At his trial for possession of marijuana, he argued that the drug charge
was a "frame" and that police officers were "out to get him."' 56 Prior to
the court-conducted voir dire examination, the defendant's counsel had
48. Id at 311-13 (citing Pinderv. State, 27 Fla. 370,8 So. 837 (1891) (homicide); Hill v.
State, 112 Miss. 260, 72 So. 1003 (1916) (homicide); State v. McAfee, 64 N.C. 301 (1870)
(rape)).
49. 435 F.2d 1110 (4th Cir. 1970).
50. Id. at 1111.
51. 267 F.2d 62 (1st Cir. 1959).
52. Id at 66.
53. Id; see United States v. Carter, 440 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1971); King v. United
States, 362 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
54. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
55. 404 U.S. 1057 (1972) (petition for certiorari granted).
56. 409 U.S. at 525.
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requested the judge to ask the prospective jurors four questions
designed to elicit possible prejudice against the defendant. Two of
these specifically addressed racial attitudes, the third related to
prejudice against beards, and the fourth concerned pretrial publicity
about the community's drug problem.57 The judge declined to ask the
questions.58
The Supreme Court held that the trial court's refusal to make any
inquiry into the possible racial bias of prospective jurors denied the
defendant a fair trial in violation of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.5 9 The Court stated:
Since one of the purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is to insure the "essential demands of fairness,"
and since a principal purpose of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to prohibit the States from invidiously discriminat-
ing on the basis of race, we think that the Fourteenth Amendment
required the judge in this case to interrogate the jurors upon the sub-
ject of racial prejudice.
60
The Court, however, found that the question relating to possible
prejudice against beards was not constitutionally required.61 Although
a juror might have harbored prejudice against persons wearing beards,
the traditionally broad discretion of the trial judge and the Court's "in-
ability to constitutionally distinguish possible prejudice against beards
from a host of other possible similar prejudices" 62 convinced the Court
that the question was not required.
The Court's holding that racial questioning was required was not
premised solely on the "essential fairness" requirement enunciated in
57. The four categories of questions requested included: (1) "Would you fairly try this
case on the basis of the evidence and disregarding the defendant's race?"; (2) "You have no
prejudice against negroes? Against black people? You would not be influenced by the use
of the term 'black'?"; (3) "Would you disregard the fact that this defendant wears a beard in
deciding this case?"; and (4) "Did you watch the television show about the local drug prob-
lem a few days ago when a local policeman appeared for a long time? Have you heard
about that show? Have you read or heard about recent newspaper articles to the effect that
the local drug problem is bad? Would you try this case solely on the basis of the evidence
presented in this courtroom? Would you be influenced by the circumstances that the prose-
cution's witness, a police officer, has publicly spoken on TV about drugs?" Id at 525 n.2.
58. 409 U.S. at 526. The trial judge, however, did submit three general questions relat-
ing to prejudice as specified in South Carolina Code § 38-202 (1962). The three questions
were: (1) "Have you formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant, Gene Ham?"; (2) "Are you conscious of any bias or prejudice for or against
him?"; and (3) "Can you give the State and the defendant a fair and impartial trial?" 409
U.S. at 526 n.3.
59. 409 U.S. at 526-27.
60. Id
61. Id at 528. Lack of material in the record substantiating any pretrial publicity prej-
udicial to Ham prevented the Court from determining the merits of the issue of the request
to question potential jurors with regard to pretrial publicity. Id
62. Id
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Aldridge.63 The Court recognized the constitutional stature of this
right, specifically derived from the fourteenth amendment's concern
with invidious discrimination on the basis of race. 64 By making the
distinction between an inquiry about racial attitudes and an inquiry
about attitudes towards a bearded appearance, the Court in Ham
resolved any doubt about the constitutional source of the right to racial
inquiry: it is founded on the express recognition in the fourteenth
amendment of race as a category traditionally subject to discrim-
ination.
65
It is unclear from the Ham opinion whether the Court intended to
limit the application of this constitutional right. The Court may have
intended a limited application by its statement that interrogation of ju-
rors was required "in this case" 66 and its characterization of the Al-
dridge holding as requiring interrogation of jurors "under the
circumstances of that case." 67 The Court did not, however, expressly
define the parameters of the constitutional right to racial inquiry on
voir dire.
Courts after Ham displayed confusion about whether the Court in
Ham had announced a per se constitutional rule requiring racial in-
quiry during voir dire in all circumstances or a rule requiring racial
inquiry only in special circumstances similar to those found in Ham .68
Indicative of such confusion were the opinions in United States v.
63. The Court noted that the opinion in Aidridge relied upon a number of state court
holdings to find that failure to pose the questions relating to racial prejudice did not meet
the essential demands of fairness, but that its holding "was not expressly grounded upon any
constitutional requirement." 409 U.S. at 526.
64. "The inquiry as to racial prejudice derives its constitutional stature from the firmly
established precedent of Adridge and the numerous state cases upon which it relied, and
from a principal purpose as well as from the language of those who adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id at 528.
65. See note 3 supra.
66. 409 U.S. at 527.
67. Id at 526.
68. Compare United States v. Robinson, 485 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that
racial inquiry was constitutionally mandated in the trial of a black defendant accused of
failing to provide current address and to report for induction to Selective Service) and
United States v. Carter, 440 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 1971) (racial inquiry required in trial of
black defendant accused of bank robbery; court quoted 41dridge extensively and noted the
First Circuit's broad interpretation of Aldridge in Frasier v. United States, 268 F.2d 62 (Ist
Cir. 1959), as requiring racial questioning in nonviolent crime circumstances) with United
States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (refusal to inquire into racial bias permissible
because the factual situation did not present circumstances similar to those of Aldridge or
Ham) and United States v. Bear Runner, 502 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1974) (sufficiency of trial
court's racial questioning on voir dire determined by circumstances of the case) and United
States v. Walker, 491 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974) (refusal to inquire
into racial prejudice permissible because the factual circumstances did not indicate racial
overtones or any showing of prejudice).
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Robinson69 and United States v. Diggs.
70
In Robinson, the defendant had been convicted for failure to keep
his local draft board informed of his current address and for failure to
report for induction. The Third Circuit held that the district court's
refusal to permit defense counsel's request for a voir dire inquiry into
the possible racial prejudice of the prospective jurors was reversible er-
ror.71 The Third Circuit based its ruling on the "constitutional dimen-
sions" of the right to racial inquiry that it found established byAdridge
and Ham.72 Thus, by applying the right to the circumstances before it,
the court necessarily gave the right a broad interpretation.
In Diggs, the defendants were black men accused of armed rob-
bery. Stating that the mere fact that the defendants were black did not
require racial inquiry on voir dire,73 the court held that the defendants
were not entitled to an inquiry into racial prejudice during voir dire
because the facts in that case were not similar to those of,4dridge and
Ham.74 The Diggs opinion thus evidenced a much narrower interpre-
tation of Aldridge and Ham than the Robinson opinion.
Ristaino v. Ross
The Supreme Court's decision in Ristaino v. Ross75 further re-
flected the judicial confusion following Aldridge and Ham. Ross, one
of several black defendants, was convicted by a Massachusetts court of
armed robbery, assault and battery with intent to murder, and assault
and battery with a dangerous weapon. The victim was a white security
guard. Prior to the voir dire examination, Ross requested that each of
the prospective jurors be asked if his or her determination of an indi-
vidual's credibility would be affected by race.76 The trial judge denied
the defendant's request because he was not persuaded that any purpose
would be accomplished by racial inquiry.77 As the sole reason for ask-
ing the question was the racial difference between the victim and de-
69. 485 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1973).
70. 522 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852 (1976).
71. 485 F.2d at 1160.
72. Id at 1159: "Any doubts as to the mandatory requirements of the Aldridge rule
were dispelled by the case ofHam v. South Carolina decided after the opinion of the district
court had been handed down. The Supreme Court emphasized that the right to have the
judge make inquiry on voir dire as to racial prejudice was one of constitutional dimensions."
73. See United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310, 1318-19 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 852 (1976).
74. Id at 1318.
75. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
76. The question proposed by Ross was as follows: "Are there any of you who believe
that a white person is more likely to be telling the truth than a black person?" Id at 590 n.1.
77. Id at 591. The court mas required by statute to inquire generally into prejudice.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § 28 (West 1959). The standard question was as follows:
"If any of you are related to the defendants or to the victim or if any of you have any interest
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fendant, the trial judge suggested that an admonishment to the jury
that it was not to consider anything other than the evidence presented
would be the best approach. 78 The trial judge did note that the victim's
status as a security guard compounded the problem, however, and
therefore asked the panel a question concerning law enforcement
affiliation.
79
Ross appealed his conviction to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, contending that his federal constitutional rights were vi-
olated by the denial of his request that prospective jurors be questioned
specifically about racial prejudice.80 The Massachusetts high court re-
jected this contention without considering the implications of Aldridge,
stating that the trial judge was required only to ask questions specified
by statute or judicial decision, and that otherwise it was within the
court's discretion to permit further questioning.81
Although the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,
8 2 it
remanded the case to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for
reconsideration in light of the Court's recent decision in Ham.83 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts again affirmed the convic-
tion, holding that Ross was not a "special target for racial prejudice" as
was Ham.84 The court reasoned that Ham did not announce "a new
constitutional principle requiring that [such] questions ...be put to
prospective jurors in all State criminal trials when the defendant is
black."8s5 Rather, the court reasoned that Ham presented a special cir-
cumstances rule, requiring racial inquiry when a black defendant is the
focus of public attention resulting from community involvement in
civil rights activities.8 6 Ross' subsequent petition for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court was denied.
8 7
Attacking the decision on remand in a federal habeas corpus peti-
in this case, or have formed an opinion or is sensible of any bias or prejudice, you should
make it known to the court at this time." 424 U.S. at 592 n.3.
78. 424 U.S. at 591.
79. Id at 591 & n.2.
80. Commonwealth v. Ross, 361 Mass. 665, 282 N.E.2d 70 (1972), vacated and re-
manded, 410 U.S. 901, aff'd on rehearing, 363 Mass. 665, 296 N.E.2d 810, cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1080 (1973).
81. Id at 682, 282 N.E.2d at 80.
82. 410 U.S. 901 (1973).
83. Id
84. 363 Mass. 665, 672, 296 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1973).
85. Id at 671, 296 N.E.2d at 815.
86. Id at 673, 296 N.E.2d at 815-16.
87. 414 U.S. 1080 (1973). Justice Marshall dissented from the Court's refusal to review
Ross' petition for certiorari on the grounds that it denied the defendant essential fairness
enunciated in Aldridge and Ham; together with the special concern for race in the fourteenth
amendment, fairness demanded that racial inquiry be allowed during the voir dire examina-
tion whenever the defendant is black. "To deny this petition for certiorari is to see our
decision in Ham v. South Carolina stillborn and to write an epitaph for those 'essential de-
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tion, Ross renewed his contention that he should have been allowed to
question the prospective jurors regarding racial prejudice.88 The dis-
trict court granted the writ of habeas corpus, and the First Circuit af-
firmed.89 Although the appellate court suggested that Ham was limited
to its facts, the court held that the facts in Ross, involving violent
crimes allegedly committed against a white security guard by a black
defendant, presented a situation similar to Ham, which required spe-
cific questioning about racial prejudice.90
On review of the habeas corpus action, the Supreme Court framed
its inquiry in terms of two issues: (1) the narrow issue of whether Ross
"was constitutionally entitled to require the asking of a question specif-
ically directed to racial prejudice"; 91 and (2) the broader question
"whether Ham announced a requirement applicable whenever there
may be a confrontation in a criminal trial between persons of different
races or different ethnic origins." 92
The Court first referred to the discussion in Ham that had ad-
dressed the defendant's entitlement to a question about prejudice
against a bearded appearance, stating:
The Constitution does not always entitle a defendant to have ques-
tions posed during voir dire directed to matters that conceivably
might prejudice veniremen against him .... Thus, the State's obli-
gation to the defendant to impanel an impartial jury generally can be
satisfied by less than an inquiry into a specific prejudice feared by the
defendant.
93
The Court then turned to what it characterized as the recognition
in Ham "that some cases may present circumstances in which an im-
permissible threat to the fair trial guaranteed by due process is posed
by a trial court's refusal to question prospective jurors specifically
about racial prejudice during voir dire."' 94 The Court could have inter-
preted the Ham opinion as having concluded that the combined effect
of the due process requirement of essential fairness and the fourteenth
amendment's principal purpose of prohibiting invidious discrimination
bring constitutional stature to any request for racial inquiry on voir
dire.95 The Ristaino Court, however, stated that Ham did not an-
mands of fairness' recognized by this Court forty years ago inAldridge." Id at 1085 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
88. Ross v. Ristaino, 508 F.2d 754, 754-55 (1st Cir. 1974) (recounting prior
proceedings).
89. Id
90. Id at 756 (quoting the district court): "[The] likelihood of infection of the verdict
[by racial prejudice] was at least as great as in Ham."
91. 424 U.S. 589, 590 (1976).
92. Id
93. Id at 594-95 (citing Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527-28 (1973)).
94. 424 U.S. at 595.
95. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526-27 (1973). See text accompanying
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nounce a requirement that a request for racial inquiry be granted
whenever a criminal trial involves a confrontation between persons of
different races or different ethnic origins.96 Instead, as interpreted in
Ristaino, the Ham opinion "reflected an assessment of whether under
all the circumstances presented there was a constitutionally significant
likelihood that, absent questioning about racial prejudice, the jurors
would not be as 'indifferent as [they stand] -unswome.' ,97
The Ristaino Court thus interpreted Ham as the announcement of
a "special circumstances" rule. Under this rule, a court is required to
allow defendants to ask questions designed to elicit racial prejudice
only when the special circumstances of a case indicate a significant
likelihood of prejudice by the jurors. As the defendant in Ham was a
prominent community civil rights activist and intended to present the
defense that he had been framed in retaliation for his civil rights activi-
ties, the Ristaino Court determined that in Ham racial issues were "in-
extricably bound up with the conduct of the trial."'98 The Court
concluded, however, that racial issues were not so involved in Ris-
taino .99 Inquiry into the racial prejudice of the prospective jurors at
the voir dire examination in Ristaino was not constitutionally man-
dated because, according to the Court, an impartial jury in that case
could have been obtained by directing general questions to the prospec-
tive jurors. 100
Rosales-Lopez
The Supreme Court in Rosales-Lopez v. United States10 l addressed
note 60 supra. The Ham Court's conclusion that due process and the fourteenth amendment
"required the judge in this case to interrogate the jurors upon the subject of racial
prejudice," id (emphasis added), could have been intended to limit its holding to a case in
which the defendant is black and adverse witnesses are white.
96. 424 U.S. at 596. The Court specifically rejected the argument for a per se constitu-
tional rule: "We note that such a per se rule could not, in principle, be limited to cases
involving possible racial prejudice. It would apply with equal force whenever voir dire ques-
tioning about ethnic origins was sought, and its logic could encompass questions concerning
other factors, such as religious affiliation or national origin. In our heterogeneous society
policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption-as a
per se rule-that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the
accident of birth, or the choice of religion." Id n.8 (citing Connors v. United States, 158
U.S. 408, 415 (1895)).
97. 424 U.S. at 596 (quoting COKE ON LrrrLETON 155b (19th ed. 1832)).
98. 424 U.S. at 597.
99. Id. at 597-98: "The mere fact that the victim of the crimes alleged was a white man
and the defendants were Negroes was less likely to distort the trial than were the special
factors involved in Ham. The victim's status as a security officer. . . was cited by respective
defense counsel primarily as a separate source of prejudice, not as an aggravating racial
factor, and the trial judge dealt with it by his question about law-enforcement affiliations."
100. Id at 598.
101. 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
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the question whether it was reversible error for a federal trial court to
reject the defendant's request of inquiry into the prospective juror's
possible racial or ethnic prejudice against the defendant. 10 2 In that
case, defendant Rosales-Lopez, a man of Mexican descent, was con-
victed in the district court for smuggling Mexican aliens into the
United States.103 Prior to trial, the judge refused the defendant's
request that his counsel or the judge ask questions of the prospec-
tive jurors specifically directed to elicit possible prejudice against
Mexicans.104
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction,
and noted that there is an established rule in the federal courts that
racial inquiry should be made of the prospective jurors in prosecutions
involving minority defendants, at least when special circumstances in-
dicating that the defendant's race may be a factor in the trial,105 are
present. The court declared, however, that "the extent of the federal
rule is unclear"' 0 6 and concluded that the facts of Rosales-Lopez did
not indicate the presence of "special circumstances," which mandate
voir dire questioning concerning racial prejudice.
10 7
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's hold-
ing,108 no opinion gained a majority. 0 9 In his plurality opinion, how-
ever, Justice White attempted to define the parameters of the
constitutional standard for questioning prospective jurors established
by Ham and Rislaino. In defining this standard, Justice White stated
that there exists "no constitutional presumption of juror bias for or
against members of any particular racial or ethnic group."' "0 Further-
more, under this standard defined by Justice White, confrontation in a
criminal case between persons of different racial or ethnic backgrounds
102. id at 183.
103. Id at 184-85.
104. The defendant submitted a list of 26 questions. One of the questions submitted by
the defendant to elicit prejudice against Mexicans was: "Would you consider the race or
Mexican descent of Humberto Rosales-Lopez in your evaluation of the case? How would it
affect you?" 451 U.S. at 185. Instead, the trial judge submitted a general question: "Do any
of you have any particular feelings one way or the other about aliens or could you sit as a
fair and impartial juror if you were called upon to do so?" Id at 186.
105. "A longstanding rule of criminal justice in the federal courts holds that questions
regarding possible racial prejudice should be put to the venire in prosecutions of minority
defendants, at least where 'special circumstances' indicate that the defendant's race may be a
factor in the trial." 617 F.2d 1349, 1354 (9th Cir. 1980).
106. 617 F.2d at 1354.
107. Id
108. 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
109. Justice White wrote an opinion that was joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and
Powell. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the result, but wrote a separate opinion that was
joined by Chief Justice Burger. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissented.
110. 451 U.S. at 190.
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does not invoke a per se constitutional rule requiring inquiry into racial
prejudice."' Justice White reiterated the Ristaino Court's distinction
that the need to inquire specifically into possible racial prejudice in
Ham arose from the critical factor, not present in Ristaino, that racial
issues were " 'inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial.' " 112
Thus, "[o]nly when there are more substantial indications of the likeli-
hood of racial or ethnic prejudice affecting the jurors in a particular
case does the trial court's denial of a defendant's request to examine the
jurors' ability to deal impartially with this subject amount to an uncon-
stitutional abuse of discretion."
' 13
In finding that racial inquiry was not constitutionally mandated in
Rosales-Lopez, the Court departed from, its previous holding in Al-
dridge, in which Chief Justice Hughes noted that the essential demands
of fairness required a broad right to voir dire when the defendant is of
a race different from that of the juror, and retreated from its decision in
Ham, in which the Court again expressed its concern for the essential
demands of fairness and added that the fourteenth amendment's due
process guarantee requires voir dire examination regarding racial
prejudice. Thus, the Supreme Court answered the questions raised by
Aldridge and Ham: (1) the right to racial inquiry does have a constitu-
tional basis in the sixth amendment and in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment; and (2) this constitutional protection is limited
to cases similar to Aldridge and Ham, that is, to cases in which special
circumstances indicate a distinct possibility of prejudice.
An "Appropriate Nonconstitutional Standard"
for Federal Courts
Although the Court in Ristaino concluded that racial inquiry was
not constitutionally required, the Court noted that it would have re-
quired racial inquiry by a federal court in the same circumstances
through the exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory power over the
federal court system. "14 The Court further declared that it would have
recognized the result in Aldridge as an exercise of this supervisory
power.' 15 The Court thus indicated that its supervisory role permits the
111. Id
112. Id at 189 (quoting the Ristaino Court's characterization of the Ham circumstances,
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. at 597).
113. 451 U.S. at 190.
114. 424 U.S. at 597 n.9. "Although we hold that voir dire questioning directed to racial
prejudice was not constitutionally required, the wiser course generally is to propound appro-
priate questions designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant. Under
our supervisory power we would have required as much of a federal court faced with the
circumstances here."
115. Id at 598 n.10.
[Vol. 33
RACIAL BIAS INQUIRIES ON VOIR DIRE
development of a separate federal standard for determining whether to
allow racial inquiry during the voir dire examination.
In Rosales-Lopez, having determined that racial inquiry was not
constitutionally required, Justice White turned to an examination of an
appropriate nonconstitutional standard for federal courts based on the
supervisory power indicated in Ristaino. l l6 In defining an appropriate
nonconstitutional standard, Justice White weighed the criminal defend-
ant's desire for a trial that is as impartial as possible against the interest
in avoiding the defendant's misconception "that justice in a court of
law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin [or] the accident of
birth."117 Justice White decided that ordinarily a defendant's request
for racial inquiry in a federal court during the voir dire examination
should be honored. 118 "Failure to honor his request, however, will
only be reversible error where the circumstances of the case indicate
that there is a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice
might have influenced the jury."'1 9 Thus, the federal courts are re-
quired to allow racial inquiry when there is a "reasonable possibility"
that racial prejudice may bias the jurors. Situations involving such spe-
cial circumstances that a constitutional right to racial questioning
would be invoked necessarily fall within the scope of the nonconstitu-
tional "reasonable possibility" standard.
Additionally, the Court in Rosales-Lopez concluded that "federal
courts must make such an inquiry when requested by a defendant ac-
cused of a violent crime and where the defendant and the victim are
members of different racial or ethnic groups." 120 Violent crimes com-
mitted by a defendant of one race or ethnicity against a member of
another racial or ethnic group typically raise a "reasonable possibility"
that the race of the defendant may preclude a fair trial.121 Without
further enumeration, the Court also noted that other circumstances
might suggest the need for such inquiry to determine whether there was
116. 451 U.S. at 190. Justice White noted that if special circumstances indicating a sub-
stantial likelihood of racial or ethnic prejudice are not present, the judicial system within
which a trial court operates determines the necessity of allowing racial inquiry on voir dire.
Id Federal courts are thus required to conduct inquiry on voir dire as to racial prejudice in
circumstanceg as determined by the Supreme Court in exercising its supervisory power over
the federal courts; state courts are free to develop a separate standard.
117. Id (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8 (1975)).
118. The Court noted that "the judge need not defer to a defendant's request where
there is no rational possibility of racial prejudice. But since the courts are seeking to assure
the appearance and reality of a fair trial, if the defendant claims a meaningful ethnic differ-
ence between himself and the victim, his voir dire request should ordinarily be satisfied."
451 U.S. at 191 n.7.
119. Id at 191.
120. Id at 192.
121. Id: "It remains an unfortunate fact in our society that violent crimes perpetrated
against members of other racial or ethnic groups often raise such a possibility."
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a reasonable possibility that racial prejudice would influence the
jurors.1
22
Under the facts of Rosales-Lopez, the Supreme Court decided that
the issue of racial prejudice was not so inextricably bound up with the
conduct of the trial in that case as to invoke the special circumstances
rule of Ham. 23 In addition, the case did not involve a violent act with
a victim of a different ethnic or racial group. 24 Therefore, the issue
was whether the total external circumstances of the case indicated a
"reasonable possibility" that racial prejudice would influence the
jurors.1
25
The Court stated two reasons for its determination that the factual
circumstances involved in Rosales-Lopez did not present a reasonable
possibility of racial prejudice. First, the trial court satisfactorily ques-
tioned the prospective jurors regarding their attitudes towards aliens.
Two jurors were eliminated for cause during the trial court's question-
ing about aliens. The court concluded that, by removing these two ju-
rors, any reasonable possibility that the panel included jurors who
harbored an undisclosed prejudice against Mexican aliens had been
eliminated.' 26 Second, the Court indicated that the ethnic difference
between the key government witness, a Caucasian, and the defendant
did not raise a reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice
would bias the trial.' 27 Rosales-Lopez argued that the possible "latent
racial antagonism" of the jurors was likely to be exacerbated by the
government witness' testimony concerning the close relationship be-
tween the witness' daughter, a Caucasian, and Rosales-Lopez. The
Court answered this contention by stating that Rosales-Lopez did not
make this argument to the court in support of his requested ques-
tions.' 28 Furthermore, the Court stated, even if he had made the argu-
ment, there were other government witnesses, including three illegal
122. Id
123. 451 U.S. 182, 192 (1981).
124. Id
125. Id at 192-93: "Petitioner, therefore, falls within that category of cases in which the
trial court must determine if the external circumstances of the case indicate a reasonable
possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice will influence the jury's evaluation of the
evidence."
126. Id The Court also noted that the trial court asked whether there were any grounds
that the jurors felt would preclude them from sitting as fair and impartial jurors. "Coupled
with the question concerning aliens, there is little reason to believe that a juror who did not
answer this general question would have answered affirmatively a question directed nar-
rowly at racial prejudice." Id at 193 n.8. A narrowly drawn question, however, is more
useful in ascertaining a juror's state of mind with regard to racial prejudice because jurors
do not, in many cases, realize that they hold prejudices. See note 2 & accompanying text
supra. By confronting jurors with direct questions aimed at eliciting racial prejudice, jurors
may possibly stop and think about their true feelings regarding racial prejudice.
127. 451 U.S. at 193-94.
128. See note 78 & accompanying text supra.
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aliens, who corroborated the testimony against Rosales-Lopez concern-
ing his smuggling activities.1 29 Thus, the Court concluded that the
questioning conducted by the trial court was sufficient to ensure an im-
partial trial.
Criticism of the Present Rule
In sum, the Court has established that, in the federal system, there
are three instances in which the denial of racial inquiry during the voir
dire examination will constitute reversible error. First, when the case
involves special circumstances such as those present in Ham that
demonstrate that racial factors are inextricably bound up with the con-
duct of the trial, racial inquiry during the voir dire examination is con-
stitutionally mandated. 130 Second, when the case involves violent
crimes and the defendant and victim are members of different racial or
ethnic groups, a reasonable possibility of prejudice exists and federal
courts are directed by the Supreme Court's supervisory power to allow
racial inquiry on voir dire when requested by the defendant.' 3' Third,
in all other circumstances when the defendant can show that there is a
reasonable possibility that racial prejudice will infect the conduct of the
trial, the defendant's request for racial inquiry should be honored.
1 32
The state courts, however, are constitutionally required to allow
such questioning only when racial issues are inextricably bound up
with the conduct of the trial, as in Ham. 33 In all other circumstances,
the state courts are free to determine the propriety of racial inquiry.
"Special Circumstances" as a Constitutional Standard
The holding in Ham did not expressly limit its recognition of the
constitutional right to voir dire questioning aimed at racial prejudice to
cases involving special circumstances. 134 Not until Ristaino did the
Court retreat from the notion of a broad right to ask questions on voir
dire concerning prejudice. By interpreting the Aldridge result as an ap-
129. Id at 193. Arguably, corroborating testimony regarding the defendant's smuggling
activities would not cure the problem of latent racial antagonism exacerbated by the govern-
ment witness' testimony with which the defendant was concerned. Some of the testimony
offered by the Caucasian government witness related to the defendant's relationship to the
daughter of that witness, whereas the corroborating testimony of other illegal aliens related
to the defendant's smuggling activities. Thus, the latent racial bias likely to be elicited by
some of the testimony of the Caucasian witness may not have been diluted or dissipated by
the nonwhite witnesses' testimony.
130. Id at 190. It still remains unclear whether and to what extent the "special circum-
stances rule" will be extended past the precise factual setting of Ham.
131. See notes 120-21 & accompanying text supra.
132. See notes 118-19 & accompanying text supra.
133. See note 99 supra.
134. See notes 59-60 & accompanying text supra.
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plication of the Court's supervisory power to the situation presented in
that case rather than as a constitutionally mandated result,1 35 and by
interpreting the constitutionally mandated result in Ham as required
because of special circumstances, 36 the Ristaino Court rejected this
broad right. As Ham is the only case in which the Supreme Court has
found the existence of special circumstances, perhaps the meaning of
special circumstances is limited to the precise factual circumstances of
Ham-a black defendant who is prominent in civil rights activities in
his or her community.
If this case, or one similar to it, is the only case in which the special
circumstances rule will be invoked, then the rule is effectively devoid of
any real significance, for it will rarely be applied. 137 Even in Ristaino, a
case involving a violent crime perpetrated by a black defendant against
a white victim, the Court did not find the existence of special circum-
stances that would require racial inquiry on voir dire.
Similarly, in Rosales-Lopez the Court did not find special circum-
stances sufficient to trigger a constitutional right to racial inquiry when
the defendant, a man of Mexican descent bearing a Mexican surname,
faced jurors impaneled for a district court of the Southern District of
California. If the factor of community sentiment in each case is consid-
ered, Rosales-Lopez presented circumstances similar to those present in
Ham. 13  In both cases, there was a connection between the defendant
and an issue that had provoked public concern. Although charged with
the unrelated crime of drug possession, the defendant in Ham had been
135. See note 115 & accompanying text supra.
136. See note 99 & text accompanying notes 94, 97 supra.
137. State and federal courts have been reluctant to find the existence of special circum-
stances. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 491 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1974) (no racial overtones
or special circumstances when black defendant was charged with passing a forged check);
Commonwealth v. Lumley, 367 Mass. 213, 327 N.E.2d 683 (1975) (no special circumstances
presented when black defendant was charged with an unnatural and lascivious act and with
assault and battery); Commonwealth v. Ryles, 363 Mass. 674, 296 N.E.2d 816, cert. denied,
414 U.S. 980 (1973) (no special circumstances when two black defendants were accused of
assault and battery on a white taxicab driver); Commonwealth v. Nelson, 2 Mass. App. 843,
311 N.E.2d 586 (1974) (no special circumstances when black defendant was accused of rap-
ing white woman); People v. Harrell, 398 Mich. 384, 247 N.W.2d 829 (1976) (no special
circumstances when black woman was arrested for murder at her doorstep following a police
chase and a confrontation between police and defendant and her family).
138. In Aldridge, Chief Justice Hughes stated that the dominant sentiment of the com-
munity should not be the focus when evaluating the need for racial inquiry; rather, the focus
should be on the individual prospective jurors. 283 U.S. 308, 314 (1931). See notes 39-41 &
accompanying text supra. The consideration of community sentiment required in Ham and
Rosales-Lopez does not run counter to this admonition of Chief Justice Hughes because he
was focusing on the laws of the community, not on the issues of public concern, as an ex-
pression of the dominant sentiment of the community. See 283 U.S. at 314. See note 39 &
accompanying text supra. To determine the community sentiment in Ham and Rosales-
Lopez, one must focus not on the seeming equality of the laws of the community, but on the
potential bias of the prospective jurors who make up that community.
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active in the local race-related civil rights movement; the defendant in
Rosales-Lopez was charged with smuggling aliens into the United
States from Mexico and faced trial in southern California, where the
subject of illegal Mexican aliens is a sensitive and politically volatile
issue.' 39 Thus, the repeated failure of the Court to find the existence of
special circumstances that would constitutionally require voir dire
questioning aimed at eliciting racial prejudice has severely limited the
application of this standard.
"Reasonable Possibility" as a Nonconstitutional Standard
The "appropriate nonconstitutional standard" as explored in
Rosales-Lopez creates problems of too narrow application and vague
definition similar to those illustrated by the Court's application of the
special circumstances constitutional rule. The Court's formulation of
the reasonable possibility standard does not clarify the circumstances in
which racial questioning will be required under the Court's supervisory
authority. In articulating the reasonable possibility standard, the Court
gave specific guidelines only for cases that involve interracial vio-
lence.14° In all other cases, however, the trial courts must still deter-
mine whether a reasonable possibility of prejudice exists on the basis of
the facts of each case.
The rationale for the Court's allowance of racial inquiry in cases
involving interracial violence is equally applicable in cases involving
nonviolent crimes. Because many crimes, such as drug possession, are
victimless, a rule focusing the finding of a reasonable possibility of
prejudice on cases in which the defendant and victim are of different
racial or ethnic identities would exclude from the reasonable possibility
standard a victimless crime. Ham is a case in point, because it involved
a nonviolent, victimless crime. In Ham, however, the circumstances
presented such'a strong possibility of prejudice that racial inquiry was
constitutionally mandated.
An additional reason for criticizing the Court's specific formula-
139. REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERICANS AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE SOUTHWEST, Summary (March 1970). According
to the Commission's study, Mexican Americans living in Arizona, California, Colorado,
New Mexico, and Texas constitute the largest cultural minority in the Southwest. The inves-
tigations undertaken by the Commission revealed widespread discrimination against Mexi-
can Americans: "Evidence shows that it is a fact of the Mexican American's life to be
subjected to unduly harsh treatment by police, to be frequently arrested on insufficient
grounds, to receive harassment and penalties disproportionately severe compared to those
imposed on Anglos for the same acts." Id at 2. The Commission's report "found that the
Anglo community, which traditionally has regarded the Mexican American people and cul-
ture as inferior, has treated them with indifference and disrespect." Id at 14.
140. That is, federal trial courts must make some inquiry about racial prejudice "when
requested by a defendant accused of a violent crime and where the defendant and the victim
are members of different racial or ethnic groups." 451 U.S. at 192.
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tion of the reasonable possibility standard is that the determination of
whether the reasonable possibility of prejudice exists depends on
whether the racial or ethnic background of the defendant differs from
that of the victim, rather than on whether the racial or ethnic back-
ground of the defendant differs from that of the jurors. As the voir dire
questioning seeks to determine whether the jurors are prejudiced, it
seems self-evident that there exists an even greater possibility of
prejudice when the jurors and the person upon whom they will pass
judgment, the defendant, are of different racial or ethnic groups than
when the victim and the defendant are of different groups. It is not
uncommon that a juror of one race or ethnic background will be
prejudiced towards a defendant of a different race or ethnic back-
ground regardless of whether the victim is of the same race as the de-
fendant. In addition, comparing the identities of the victim and the
defendant of a crime will present problems in cases involving victimless
crimes. Thus, a reasonable possibility test, which focuses on the back-
grounds of the defendant and the victim, seems inadequate to protect a
defendant against the possibility of an unfair trial because of the pres-
ence of prejudiced jurors.
A Proposed Standard
The Supreme Court has demonstrated that, in the area of racial
inquiry on voir dire, it does not intend to declare a broad constitutional
standard. The Court has not enunciated a clear definition of the spe-
cial circumstances rule. It has narrowly defined the reasonable possi-
bility standard and has unfairly limited the scope of its application. As
a consequence, the litigants and courts will remain uncertain about the
circumstances under which racial inquiry on voir dire is required. A
case-by-case method is left to define this important area of a defend-
ant's rights at trial.
There is, however, a clear need for a constitutional standard to
delineate the rights of a criminal defendant to question prospective ju-
rors about racial prejudice.141 A broad and more precise constitutional
standard is necessary to replace the narrow and vague standards that
presently guide the courts. Two powerful constitutional interests, the
guarantee of a fair trial and due process, mandate the inquiry into pro-
spective jurors' possible prejudices during voir dire. Together, these
two constitutional interests call for an effective and probing voir dire
examination to ensure that a defendant receives every assurance of a
141. It may be difficult to define different racial or ethnic groups. 415 U.S. at 194
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). This determination should be left to the trial courts on a case-
by-case basis, and should not hinder the application of the constitutional standard proposed
in this Comment.
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fair and impartial trial.' 42
The deprivation of an impartial jury is particularly onerous in
light of the fact that the right to trial by jury attaches only in cases
involving serious offenses. 143 Thus, a trial concerning a serious crime
tried by a jury of prejudiced jurors may result in an unjustified loss of
liberty for the defendant. In cases concerning serious crimes, the im-
partiality of the trial becomes even more important and all reasonable
measures should be taken to ensure that the jurors are not biased and
that the trial will be as impartial and as fair as possible.144
Not only would a clear constitutional standard help to ensure an
impartial trial, but it also would eliminate the distinction between the
federal and state standards in the area of racial inquiry on voir dire
sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Rosales-Lopez. Separate stan-
dards for the federal and state court systems are undesirable because a
defendant's right to question jurors about racial prejudice should not
depend on whether the defendant is being tried in a state or federal
court. The inequity of allowing two different standards for the voir
dire examination is illustrated by comparing the case of a defendant in
a federal court who is accused of mugging a pefson of another race
with the case of a defendant in state court who is accused of murdering
a person of another race. In the federal court action, racial inquiry
automatically would be required by the supervisory power of the
Supreme Court; in the state court action, however, the defendant fre-
quently would have no constitutionally mandated right to question
prospective jurors about possible racial bias, unless the circumstances
of the case indicated that the racial issues were extricably bound up
with the trial. As Ham and later cases illustrate, courts seem reluctant
to find the existence of such special circumstances. Thus, the ability to
question jurors about racial prejudice, which may be necessary to en-
142. The absence of clear Supreme Court guidance in this area may result frequently in
a miscarriage of justice. The unclear Supreme Court precedent means that defendants will
be unsure of their right to question prospective jurors about racial prejudice. Consequently,
defendants may not request voir dire examination or may drop appeals when denied voir
dire questioning in instances in which they had either a constitutional right or a supervisory
power right to the examination.
143. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968). The Duncan Court did not give a precise definition of the boundary between petty
and nonpetty offenses; the Court, however, did lay down the general rule that the authorized
penalty for a particular crime was the primary factor to be considered in determining
whether there was a right to a jury trial. 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968). The Baldwin Court
reaffirmed the Duncan holding and defined a nonpetty crime as one that authorized impris-
onment for more than six months as its penalty. 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970).
144. See Comment, The Jury as the Underwriter of the Presumption ofInnocence in State
Criminal Cases-A Role Made Passible by Duncan v. Louisiana, 49 B.U.L. Rnv. 144 n. Il
(1969); see also Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 723 (5th Cir. 1966) (en banc), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 991 (1967): "The very integrity of the fact finding process depends on impartial
venires representative of the community as a whole."
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sure an impartial trial, often depends on the court in which the defend-
ant is tried.
The concern of the majority opinion in Rosales-Lopez that al-
lowing racial inquiry in every case might indicate that the Court be-
lieves that justice turns upon a person's race should not be
controlling. 145 Although the Court was concerned with the appearance
of justice in the courts, the Court also noted that a defendant is proba-
bly more concerned with the reality of justice in his or her trial than
with the mere appearance of it. 146' The Court did not resolve this ten-
sion, but rather determined that "it is usually best to allow the defend-
ant to resolve this conflict by making the determination [whether to
question the panel about racial prejudice]." 147 The reality of justice
should always be elevated above the appearance of justice. Gross in-
justice would result if defendants were permitted to believe that per-
sons holding prejudices are allowed to serve as jurors.1 48
For these reasons, an appropriate constitutional standard would
permit racial inquiry during voir dire in all criminal cases in which the
defendant and any prospective juror are members of different racial or
ethnic groups. This standard would fulfill the requirements of Aidridge
and Ham, which accord a broad constitutional basis for racial inquiry
during voir dire.
It may be argued that it would be impractical to require extensive
questioning during the voir dire examination of each prospective juror
who has a different ethnic or racial identity from the defendant. The
argument against an extensive voir dire might suggest that the courts
would become overburdened by the resulting delay. The extra burden
on the courts that would result by requiring racial inquiry, however, is
outweighed by protecting the constitutional guarantee of an impartial
jury. Additionally, the trial judge has ample discretion during voir dire
to limit the number of questions allowed.
149
A more precise constitutional standard may economize the admin-
istration of justice by reducing the amount of litigation over whether a
defendant had the right to voir dire questioning aimed at racial
prejudice. The courts may no longer have to adjudicate the existence
of the right to question jurors concerning their prejudices on a case-by-
case basis. An additional reason for requiring a more general voir dire
right is that inquiry into the racial prejudices of a particular person is
145. 451 U.S. at 190 (citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. at 596 n.8). See notes 117-19 &
accompanying text supra.
146. 451 U.S. at 191: "Balanced against [the appearance of justicel is the criminal de-
fendant's perception that avoiding the inquiry does not eliminate the problem and that his
trial is not the place in which to elevate appearance over reality."
147. Id
148. See text at note 43 supra.
149. See note 24 & accompanying text supra.
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the easiest and most effective way to determine whether that person has
any particular prejudice.1
50
The advantages of a constitutional standard and the guarantee of
an impartial trial outweigh the small amount of hardship that might be
imposed upon the courts by requiring voir dire in all criminal cases in
which the defendant and any member of the jury are members of dif-
ferent ethnic or racial groups.
Conclusion
A defendant in a criminal trial should be provided with the oppor-
tunity to ask specific questions designed to uncover racial and ethnic
prejudice during the voir dire examination of prospective jurors. Only
in this way can a criminal defendant be assured of a fair trial by an
impartial jury when the ethnic or racial background of the defendant
differs from that of the jurors. The standards promulgated by the
Supreme Court for determining the scope of racial questions during
voir dire do not adequately protect criminal defendants, particularly in
trials involving victimless crimes and in state courts. Thus, a constitu-
tional standard should be established that would require racial inquiry
on voir dire when requested by a defendant in a criminal trial who
faces a panel of jurors with racial or ethnic backgrounds differing from
that of the defendant.
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150. See note 23 & accompanying text supra.
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